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This article examines anthropological preferences in historical and philosophical work of 
the English philosopher and mathematician, public figure and logician, Bertrand Russell. 
The intellectual history of this English philosopher is closely linked to interpretations of 
those thinkers who were his teachers and who made an important impact on the develop-
ment of his conceptions: G. F. Stout, James Ward, F. Pollock, B. Spinoza, J. Moore, L. Wittgen-
stein, G. Peano, G. Frege, A. Meinong, F. Brentano, H. Sidgwick, J. Bentham, T. Hobbes, and 
S. Freud. Special attention is given to the influence of Spinoza’s philosophy on Russell’s con-
ceptual formations. In article reveals the field of philosophy in the perspective of its author; 
how does he recognize historicist of philosophy affair matter, what values does he uphold 
and etc. Anthropological reduction is analyzed in the history of philosophy is an attempt to 
give explanation to science, arts, religion, with the help of man’s culture and to understand 
human being on the basis of these formations, executed by him (science, culture, religion, 
arts). In the works Russell not only explains quite successfully all the philosopher was think-
ing of, but also the notions of what he, exactly thinks about each examined philosopher. All 
that contributed to Russell’s creating the style of reflection which G. Ryle named “thoughtless 
experimentation”.
Keywords: anthropological measurement, history of philosophy, G. F. Stout, J. Ward, F. Pollock, 
B. Spinoza, J. Moore, L. Wittgenstein. 
Anthropological measurement of the history of philosophy should answer a number 
of questions. What is the field of philosophy from the perspective of its author? What does 
the history of philosophy rest upon? What does the author do, and how does she recognize 
her matter? What values does she uphold, and what are her personal interests and posi-
tion in the history of philosophy? And so on. Anthropological reduction in the history 
of philosophy is an attempt to explain science, arts, and religion, with the help of culture 
and to understand the human being on the basis of these formations as executed by peo-
ple (science, culture, religion, arts). Russell’s measurement of the history of philosophy is 
along these lines. His treatment is far from established standards, but it attracted many 
people by his fame as a thinker and the accessibility of his writing. His History of Western 
Philosophy was a monumental survey, followed by the fresher volume Wisdom of the West. 
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In both of these volumes and other essays, Russell not only explains quite successfully all 
he was thinking, but also the notions of what he thought exactly of each philosopher he 
examined. Historians of philosophy in the past were inclined to be more monotonous in 
formulating historical development. Russell’s works are successful in showing that phi-
losophizing can be both interesting and instructive for a mass audience.
Setting about to consider the works of philosophers of the past without philosophical 
premises is not only naïve, but also close to a positivist conception of cognitive activities 
by which a historian can restore the facts of historical reality. Critical philosophy of his-
tory dispensed with these illusions. The story of the history of philosophy means ceaseless 
work on the interpretation of fruitfulness carried out by the historians of philosophy. The 
very position of the philosopher depends upon the influence to which he was subjected. 
Russell pointed out that his outlook was formed under the influence of the ideas of four 
philosophers of the West: J. Moore, who freed himself from idealism and asserted that a 
fact did not depend on our cognition of the fact (it is not constructed by consciousness, as 
Kant considered, but is more or less dimly presented to our cognition); A. Whitehead, who 
upheld the principle of “Ockham’s Razor” as “the highest maximum of scientific philoso-
phizing”; W. James, who rejected dualism with the help of neutral monism; and L. Witt-
genstein, who proclaimed that all logical truths are tautologies, and then set out to inter-
pret the relation between language and facts [1, p. 3]. It is also worth mentioning that he 
was greatly influenced by his teachers: the Kantian James Ward, and Hegelians G. F. Stout 
and D. E. McTaggart, as well as G. Peano, G. Frege, A. Meinong, F. Brentano, H. Sidgwick, 
J. Bentham, T. Hobbes and S. Freud. Russell came to philosophy via mathematics and 
logic, but this does not belittle his interest in the history of philosophy. He read Mill, 
Kant, and Hegel, Bradley’s Logic, Spinoza, Hume, and Descartes, and of course Moore. 
He studied profoundly Leibniz, James, Bergson, Dewey, and Santayana, about whom he 
wrote monographs and profound articles, as well Hegel’s philosophy of history (1941). But 
his Weltanschauung was especially influenced by his visit to the International Congress 
on Philosophy in 1990. All this contributed to Russell’s creating a style of reflection that 
G. Ryle called “thoughtless experimentation”.
The history of philosophy is written by the philosopher with an historical inclination 
or feeling the necessity of reflecting and from time to time aiming to demonstrate his point 
of view. Russell did just this in his history of philosophy. During his studies at Trinity Col-
lege in 1893–94, Russell attended several courses on philosophy. These includedlectures 
by G. F. Stout and James Ward on the history of philosophy”. He took careful notes that 
proved useful when he later wrote his philosophical portraits of various Western philoso-
phers. Georg Frederik Stout (1860–1944), the publisher and editor of Mind (1891–1921), 
was a specialist in philosophical psychology and the author of a book on psychology. His 
own teacher James Ward (1843–1925) was an idealist and also wrote on psychology. None 
of them published general works on the history of philosophy, although Ward wrote on 
Kant, And Stout devoted two lectures to Spinoza in January 1894, six lectures on Hobbes, 
and nine on Descartes. Ward devoted part of one lecture to Spinoza in his review from 
Descartes and up to Reid and Spencer. Generally speaking, Stout embedded Spinoza in 
philosophical psychology, attributing much really to Hobbes, while Ward explored his 
metaphysics. Spinoza’s ethics were neglected by Henry Sidgwick in his two lectures on 
which Russell took partial notes. Stout concentrated his attention mainly on Spinoza’s 
theory of Man. He attached great importance to the inducement of self-preservation and 
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to his attitude to Man’s power, liberty, and perfection. Stout told his students how it was 
possible to calculate the fact that Spinoza and Hobbes divided one and the same purpose 
of cognizing Man’s passions.
Though Russell then was inclined to monistic idealism, here he supported his late 
atomism that he upheld not only in metaphysics, but also in political philosophy. Liberal, 
atomistic, individualistic outlook of man in society demands psychological confidence 
and esteem for every person with autonomous activity. However, Stout, in the monistic 
spirit of the times, proposed a criticism of the atomistic outlook on man. He told his audi-
ence in his first lecture: “Someone’s opinion just like an individual, pretending to share all 
the essence, is condemned to failure, so far as he inherits the essence of the thing, which 
is not he himself ” [2, p. 129]. Stout emphasized Spinoza’s concept of power, believing that 
power gives joy and that is the equivalent of liberty and perfection [2, p. 131]. “We are free, 
because all that happens to us, is created by ourselves” — this was typical statement of the 
authors, upholding the negative doctrine of liberty and concentrating on the absence of 
external warning. Stout also discussed the notions of some passions and attacked Spinoza 
on the concept of will. When discussing Hobbes’ world outlook, they introduced them-
selves as important precursors of deterministic psychology of Spinoza. Stout touched on 
Spinoza’s ethical and even religious questions. He considered Spinoza a relativist, and in 
certain passages he explained the ordinary usage of “good” and “evil” (although he did not 
call this “relativism”); he maintained, controversially, that Spinoza could allow something 
absolute in making distinctions between good and evil [2, p. 127].
Russell’s synopses included his regard for Spinoza. This influence on own world out-
look appeared to be long and constant. First, Stout in his lectures quoted Pollock; Russell 
read Pollock himself and 17 years later recommended that book to others. Second, Ward 
began his lectures by telling his audience how to read Spinoza’s The Ethics: “Read The 
Ethics, long commentaries, prefaces, digressions, boring sentences”. If Ward said that the 
sentences and judgments were boring, what did he mean by this? He may have shared 
Stout’s views. He noted that interest in Spinoza did not die. Russell wrote in his History of 
Western Philosophy that detailed showing is not the merit of mastership; he maintained 
that commentaries contain all the best in The Ethics [3, p. 572, 554].
The third, similar judgment by Russell, that Spinoza’s metaphysics is inconsistent, is 
also contained in Ward’s lectures. According to Ward, Spinoza’s world outlook disintegrat-
ed into the following components: his rationalistic, geometrical method was denounced 
by Kant as insolvent, although mathematics is accomplished to a considerable degree “by 
the use of clearing up mathematical intuition”, while philosophy cannot be intuitive; his 
mathematical model loses validity in its judgment of causality (as “cause” becomes equiva-
lent to “logical condition”); and the distance between finite and infinite modifications of 
the attribute cannot be crossed. As for Spinoza’s concept of God, Ward believed, that he 
was only a means, and nowadays a means “Absolute or certainty”. Ward held that the 
church had prohibited works by Spinoza before the first edition of Kant, i.e. before the 
publication of The Critique of Pure Reason in 1781, which made Kant historically more 
influential. When speaking on Spinoza’s pantheism and his impact on Hegel, he noted 
that “Erdmann is better than Spinoza”. Ward closed his lecture as follows: “In the first hint 
of his doctrine there are two aspects. The denial of free will, but it’s not worth using free-
dom as a synonym to necessity as there is much insidiousness. God creates things in case 
of inborn necessity of his own nature which at the same time acts as freedom”. To create 
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knowledge there is only the Cartesian principle of clarity and definition. Thus, Ward in-
fluenced Russell’s comprehension of Spinoza, from the point of view of classifying Spinoza 
as a mere absolute idealist. 
Russell read not only Pollock’s book, but, and evidently earlier, Erdmann’s History 
(1874), which by explaining the attributes of thought took great interest in Spinoza’s politi-
cal philosophy. While explaining moral philosophy, Erdmann united evaluations of Spi-
noza’s doctrine in the field of freedom, will, and knowledge. Russell also noted passages 
touching on three kinds of Spinoza’s knowledge: sensation or opinion, faculty of reason-
ing, and intuition. Spinoza hoped that one who realizes the necessity of tying together the 
ends of the things does not turn to will, which is present in some other relations. Even 
from his acquaintance with Spinoza, Russell had a rather high opinion of Spinoza’s psy-
chology. He wrote to Alice Smith, “I was reading Hobbes and Spinoza and in the morning 
I began to read Descartes on the subject of passion; Spinoza is smart…” Much later Russell 
denied the intellectual love of God in Spinoza’s normative ethics.
In any event, the well-known lawyer jurist Frederick Pollock (1845–1937) wrote re-
views on Spinoza’s works for popular magazines, as well as a short book, Spinoza, His Life 
and Philosophy (1880). It is not known whether Russell read Pollock’s shorter articles, but 
as we have seen he respected his critical book on Spinoza. He wrote to his friends in 1902: 
“Yes, Spinoza text is hard. I quite insistently advise you first to read the book by Pollock 
about him; there you will find out how much easier it is to penetrate into Spinoza’s heart”. 
He wrote to Lady Ottoline Morrell: “Don’t worry about reading Spinoza, it’s not time yet!.. 
If you have some time to spare, you a better read Pollock first, instead of reading Spinoza 
himself [4, p. 87].
A more important effect that Pollock produced on Russell was inspiring him to ad-
mire Spinoza. Thus, he wrote to Lady Ottoline (no. 169a, August 11): “Since I have been 
reading the book by Pollock, since the time of my being a final student, writing my di-
ploma-paper Spinoza has been one of the most important people in my inner world”. 
Pollock’s book included an excellent set of quotations from Spinoza, and Russell’s advice 
to Alice on reading Pollock was undoubtedly based on his wide studying, his being multi-
lingual, his knowledge of history and of philosophers of the past and of discoveries in sci-
ence. Moreover, he followed Green’s explaining Spinoza’s monistic idealism. At the same 
time, Russell was inclined to asceticism; Pollock wrote of “next-to incredible thrift of his 
health and economy” [4, p. 41]. Russell always criticized the church, and Spinoza was the 
right man for him in this respect as well.
Further, regarding Goethe’s interest in Spinoza, Pollock cited a passage that seemed 
glued to Russell’s reasoning. This is a passage where Goethe quoted Spinoza (ESP19): “He 
who loves God cannot endeavor that God will love him in return” [3, p. 395]. Later, Russell 
came back to Goethe, for he considered the passage misunderstood. In 1910, in his review 
for White and Sterling on the translation of Ethics, Russell mainly referred to “pedantic 
praising” by Goethe. However, at the time publication of History of Western Philosophy, 
Russell still recollected and reread him: “Goethe, who praises Spinoza, without even try-
ing to understand him, thought this proposition as an instance of self-abnegation. There 
is nothing of the sort of similar but a logical consequence of Spinoza’s metaphysics. He 
does not say that man ought not to want God to love him; he says that man who loves 
God cannot want God to love him” [3, p. 576, 558]. Russell corrected the wordy protest 
in his translation. It is possible to read all of this in a detailed book by K. Blackwell, The 
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Spinozistic Ethic of Bertrand Russell (1985) [5]. Russell called for disjoining Spinoza’s ethics 
from metaphysics even when treating him critically. He considered the latter one “the best 
examples” of “logical monism.”
After of Russell’s History of Western Philosophy had appeared, it repeatedly was a tar-
get of critical analysis. V. V. Sokolov was one of the first domestic philosophers who de-
voted an article to this book. Following the atmosphere of criticism, the thinker as a bour-
geois idealist, who inherits “bourgeois prejudices in the history of philosophy and culture” 
[6, p. 100], exhibits western centrism, incomprehension of Marxism, reducing historical 
materialism to economical materialism, and the impact of epistemology of Marxism on 
Russel’s theory of cognition. On the other hand, there were positive sides to his work: the 
close connection between philosophy and science is revealed; as a staunch supporter of 
relativism he criticized religious mythological views. This also affected the negative char-
acteristics of representatives of objective idealism (Socrates, Plato, Thomas Aquinas, He-
gel), and of subjectivism, mistakes of which resulted from attempts to ignore all the facts 
out of man. He did not consider his view to be idealistic, as he classified all philosophical 
systems either according to “the method” (empirical and a priori ones) or “according to 
by their results” (realistic and idealist) [3, p. 799]. In this sense he qualified his position as 
empirical and realistic.
As for the philosophers of the past, Russell held the highest opinion of Hume, think-
ing his philosophy to be “a modern form of nominalism” [3, p. 680], so far as here was 
the beginning of “modern philosophy of causality” [3, p. 683] and because he “finally” 
banished the notion of substance from philosophy. Russell distinguished “logical positiv-
ism” from “analytical empiricism” of Locke, Berkley, and Hume, and modern analytical 
empiricism “includes mathematics and develops powerful logical technique” [3, p. 841]. 
Russell as a neorealist sought, theoretically, — to widen the scope of empiricism so that it 
could correspond to the practice of the cognition in the world. S. Radhakrishnan thinks 
that “Since Socrates’ notion the general and up to Russell’s mathematical logic the History 
of Western Thought was presented itself as an excellent illustration for the primacy of logi-
cal beginning” [7, p. 133].
Russell maintains that all historic-philosophical methodologies proceed from deduc-
tive- mathematical (Pythagoras, Plato, Thomas Aquinas, Spinoza, Kant) and inductive-
empirical approaches (Democritus, Aristotle, Locke and all empiricists of the contempo-
rary time). The methodology of “logical analysis” can reconcile these contradictory views, 
eliminating a Pythagorean from mathematical principles and connecting “empiricism and 
personal interest in deductive parts of human mind” [3, p. 836]. The means that logical 
syntax of a language as a scientific mode of solving philosophical problems is banished 
from the philosophy of “metaphysics.” Russell constantly showed agnosticism, skepticism, 
and the persuasion that philosophy can’t prove or disprove the truth of religious dogma, 
so far as it is an intermediate sphere between theology and science [3, p. 842]. Religion, 
philosophy, and science ensure balance, which promotes Russell’s identifying materialism 
and mechanical philosophy. While he did not consider the materialist lines of Holbach, 
Diderot, Feuerbach, Gassendi, Priestly, Toland, and Bacon, he did not investigate the con-
ceptions of Campanella, Bruno, or Telesio, and as for Hobbes, and he passed him for a 
“political philosopher.” History of Philosophy itself is written on the basis of other similar 
texts. Thus, antiquity in the social-historical aspect is written by Rostovtzeff, F. Cornforth, 
Burnett, and Biven. It is beyond question that the opinions of the enumerated authors are 
Вестник СПбГУ. Философия и конфликтология. 2019. Т. 35. Вып. 2 269
original, but Russell trusts them unreservedly. His division into periods is schematic and 
uncorrected. History of Philosophy separates some systems of the most important think-
ers against a back-ground of all of the rest. And this gallery of personalities is represented 
with some preconceptions, which has already become ordinary in the history of Western 
philosophy. It is often narration, but not elucidating the problems and essence of phenom-
ena.
The thinker perceives solving the most important problems of philosophy: problems 
of social being in the philosophy of Eleatics; theories of Plato’s ideas as universalities; 
problems of the general and the single in Aristotle; problems of cogito in Descartes; of 
metaphysical monism in Spinoza; problems of the general and the single in Hegel — Rus-
sel perceived all these as the only concepts he shared in the concept of logical syntax of a 
language which he regards as the only true one. Russell’s conviction of the possibility of 
working the method of logical analysis of a language as only scientific logic leads to ignor-
ing such thinkers as Fichte and Schelling and to extreme subjectivism when studying such 
a thinker as Kant. According to Russell, philosophy — as history demonstrates it — has 
always been engaged in logic and theories concerning nature, and also in ethical and po-
litical problems. For all that, Russell is unhistorical. When addressing ethical and politi-
cal theories, Russell usually used modernizations and unacceptable analogies. Ironically, 
Russell himself condemned historians of philosophy and the erroneous method of “entire 
interpretation” of studied thinkers, in the light of the following development of philosoph-
ical thought [3, p. 490]. Analogies between earlier and later thinkers come to obliterating 
real historical borders, to the modernization of philosophical studies of the past. Thus, 
Russell considers some traits to be branches of Heraclitus’ ethics and reminding him of 
Nietzschean pattern [3, p. 61]. He stressed Plato’s “communism” [3, p. 131 et al.], compared 
Diogenes’ Cynic with Rousseau and Tolstoy [3, p. 251], compared Augustine to Tolstoy [3, 
p. 360] and Epicure — to Bonham’s utilitarianism [3, p. 263], and Epicure’s “indetermin-
ism” to the indeterminism of Eddington [3, p. 265], and so on.
Russell says frankly that he does not understand what the word “category” means 
in Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel [3, p. 210]. The concept of essence is a “notion, hopelessly 
bewildering,” because the question about essence is purely linguistic: a word can have an 
essence, but a thing cannot [3, p. 222]. The notion of dialectics is used when working in 
the traditional Aristotelean-scholastic sense of a purely wordy discussion of philosophical 
questions, which does not adequately address the truth of necessary premises. For Russell 
the truth of common sense, a philosophical truth, consists of logical conclusions; a scien-
tific truth is a result of a physical experiment, and a mystical, religious truth is capable of 
penetrating into the mysteries of the human being and undiscovered wonders. The crisis 
of the principles of modern foreign gnosiology quite naturally finds its reflection in the 
crisis of the problem of the truth as its central problem. In such a case, “the truth is an 
objective uncertainly, induced by the most passionate inner conviction” (Kierkegaard), 
i. e. the more subjective the truth is, the more sincere it is. And so far as “we can’t stop up 
believing” and “no belief whatever can be founded on reason” [3, p. 690–691], then there 
is no truth, but there is belief.
That is how the influence of Hume-like and Leibnitz-like analytical a priorism and 
aspiration for the cognition of “logical trustworthiness” that can’t be achieved, but should 
be believed in, becomes apparent. This approach to truth is purely formal; it is made abso-
lute because of the lack of induction. Such formalism is overcome by way of the criterion 
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of practice. However, the influence of the dualism of experience and logic, giving birth to 
factual-empirical and formally-logical knowledge, is much more. These levels of knowl-
edge correspond to logical truth (coordination, non-contradictoriness of knowledge) and 
factual truth (correspondence of proposals with empirical facts). Here the correspond-
ence of this dualism with the division of the knowledge in Leibnitz, into the truth of rea-
son and truths of the fact, is seen more legibly. The division of judgements into analytical 
and synthetic ones, just as for Leibnitz, is considered a logical sign of distinction between 
factualistic and formal knowledge (in more detail see: [8; 9]).
On other hand, the principles of methodology of historical and philosophical in-
vestigation sometimes brings Russell to realize the real genesis of society and the social 
significance of some philosophical conceptions before putting the question about their 
class conditionality and class destination. However, it is sooner an exclusion than a rule. 
Of course Russell’s methodology is ideological, as in the majority of cases it ascribes to 
philosophy and other spiritual factors a decisive influence on “life.” For example, Russell 
connects the property and wealth of the church in the Middle Ages, and its triumph over 
secular power, with the fact that “majority of people, including greater part of secular rul-
ers themselves” [3, p. 318] were profoundly convinced of the veritability of its dogma. The 
struggle in the slave-owning society as a matter of fact is not explained by Russell, which 
was a defining factor in ancient philosophy, carrying the center of gravity of philosophical 
interests from naturalism over ethics, which appeared together with Socrates and contin-
ued developing after him, or growth of subjectivism and mysticism at the end of history 
of ancient philosophy.
The individual activity of geniuses of philosophical thought, long fixed in the spirit of 
established Western historic-philosophical traditions, is almost exclusively defined while 
considering the history of philosophy. The absence of division into periods of historic-
philosophical process, which could be supported by objective facts and peculiarities of 
socio-economic development, brought claims to diffused characteristics and definition 
that sometimes were highly important. Russell’s explanations of the social function of 
philosophical ideas are typically idealist. “The rebellion of individualistic instincts against 
social bonds is a key to understanding philosophy, politics and feelings” [3, p. 699]. In ac-
cordance with this, the struggle between philosophical schools becomes extremely narrow 
and simplified, so far as “over a long period of time starting from the VI century B. C. and 
up to nowadays, philosophers were divided into those, who longed for strengthening so-
cial ties and those who wanted to weaken them” [3, p. 16]. Coming to the end of History of 
Western Philosophy, Russell was convinced that “the habit of careful truthfulness, acquired 
in the practice of this philosophical method (empirical and logical) can be extended over 
all the spheres of human activities. It will bring, wherever it exists, to decreasing fanati-
cism, to the increasing capacity to sympathizing with same body and mutual understand-
ing. Abandoning part of its dogmatic pretensions philosophy does not cease to offer and 
inspire this or that way of life” [3, p. 843]. One of most essential functions of philosophy 
with respect to personality, “facing the horror of cosmic solitude,” lies in the fact that 
the function of philosophy is capable “of teaching how to live without confidence and 
at the same lime not being paralyzed because of indecision” [3, p. 8–9]. In any case, we 
must correct how Russell, and before him Fung Yu-lan, and then Jaspers, Abbagnano, 
Glockner, Tomlin, Reihenbach, Kopleston, Bohensky, Radhakrishnan, and others, offered 
a new view of the history of philosophy. Like Giovanni Santinello, the author was using 
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compositions of (as many as) 160 historians of philosophy to present a philosophy created 
by thinkers for ages.
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Антропологическое измерение истории философии Бертрана Рассела*
А. С. Колесников
Санкт-Петербургский государственный университет,  
Российская Федерация, 199034, Санкт-Петербург, Университетская наб., 7–9
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гия. 2019. Т. 35. Вып. 2. С. 264–272. https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu17.2019.203 (In English)
В статье рассматриваются антропологические предпочтения в историко-философском 
творчестве английского философа и математика, общественного деятеля и логика Бер-
трана Рассела. История философии для английского философа  — это непрекращаю-
щаяся работа над интерпретацией тех мыслителей, которые были его учителями, с ко-
торыми он работал, у которых он учился, которые оказали существенное влияние на 
выработку его концептуальных решений. Среди этих мыслителей Г. Ф. Стаут, У. Джеймс, 
Ф. Поллок, Б. Спиноза, Дж. Мур, Л. Витгенштейн. Известно также влияние Дж. Пеано, 
*  Исследование выполнено при поддержке гранта Российского научного фонда, проект 
№ 17-18-01440 «Антропологическое измерение истории философии».
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Г. Фреге, А. Мейнонга, Ф. Брентано, Г. Сиджвика, И. Бентама, Т. Гоббса и З. Фрейда. Рас-
сел пришел к философии через математику и логику, но это не умаляет его интереса 
к истории философии. Определяющим при рассмотрении истории философии остается 
почти исключительно индивидуальная деятельность гениев философской мысли, рас-
пределенных в духе давно установившейся в западной историко-философской тради-
ции. Особое внимание уделено воздействию философии Спинозы на концептуальные 
решения Рассела. В статье раскрывается поле истории философии в перспективе ее ак-
тора; как осознает свое дело историк философии; какие ценности он отстаивает и т. д. 
Анализируется антропологическая редукция истории философии, когда есть попытка 
объяснить науку, искусство, религию, культурой человека и  понять человека из  этих 
произведенных им формаций (науки, культуры, религии, искусства). В своих работах 
Рассел не только разъясняет идеи рассматриваемых философов, но и высказывает соб-
ственное мнение о них. Все это способствовало тому, что Рассел создал стиль размыш-
ления, который Г. Райль назвал «необдуманным экспериментированием».
Ключевые слова: антропологическое измерение, история философии, Г. Ф. Стаут, 
Дж. Уорд, Ф. Поллок, Б. Спиноза, Дж. Мур, Л. Витгенштейн. 
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